A Return to Gold?
NOVEMBER 30, 2011 by JOHN L. CHAPMAN, JOHN A. ALLISON
“Lenin is said to have declared that the best way to destroy the Capitalist System was to debauch the currency. . . . Lenin was certainly right. There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society. . . .The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose.” — John Maynard Keynes
This summer marked the 40th anniversary of President Richard M. Nixon’s decision to sever the U.S. dollar’s official link to gold. On August 15, 1971, Nixon took to the airwaves in a national address from the Oval Office to declare that the U.S. Treasury would no longer honor foreigners’ demands to redeem dollars for gold. Because the United States was then the last country in the world with a currency defined by gold, it represented a complete and historic decoupling of the globe’s currencies—literally the money of the entire world—from the yellow metal.
For the first time in at least 2,700 years, dating to the Lydian coinage in what is now Turkey, gold was used as official money nowhere in the world. And for the first time ever the world’s monetary affairs were defined by a system of politically managed fiat currencies—that is, paper money run by governments or their central banks. The story behind Nixon’s catastrophic mistake, and the lessons it contains for today, suggest a framework for monetary policy and reforms that will induce strong and sustainable economic growth in the future.
It is important to understand what many current central bankers seem to have forgotten: the seminal importance of sound money—dependably valued, honest money whose value is not intentionally manipulated—as an institution in a modern exchange economy. Economies grow, and material wealth and welfare advance, through three interconnected phenomena, all of which are crucially supported by a well-functioning monetary unit: 1) efficient use of scarce resources via a system of prices and profit-and-loss, both of which encourage optimizing behavior on the part of all; 2) saving and the accumulation of capital for investment; and 3) the division of labor, specialization, and trade.
Regarding the last phenomenon, we would all be poor, and indeed most of us dead due to starvation, if we had to make and produce all our own food, housing, clothing, and other necessities and modern luxuries. As Adam Smith explained in his famous examination of a pin factory, dividing up the metal-straightening, wire-cutting, grinding, pin-head fashioning, and fastening and bundling operations into 18 separate steps increased the productivity of labor in the factory by at least 240-fold. (This of course dramatically increased productive output and raised workers’ real incomes.) And of course for society at large this specialization was not confined to single factories but spread across industries and agriculture: The baker, the butcher, the brewer, and the cobbler could all focus on their productive specialties and produce for a market wherein they could exchange with other specialists for desired goods.
Via economies of scale and scope, then, specialized production and exchange help to create a material horn of plenty for all in a society that’s felicitously based on peaceful, harmonious social cooperation. And here’s the key: None of this would be possible without a dependable monetary unit that serves as a medium for this exchange. Absent sound money, in fact, a division of labor, with all its specialized knowledge and skills, could hardly be exploited, because barter would mean that, say, a neurosurgeon would have to find a grocer who coincidentally needed brain surgery every time he wanted to obtain food. A barter society is by definition a primitive and poor one.
Similarly, the explosion in human progress in the last three centuries was propelled by the accumulation of capital, the tools, machinery, and other assets that increase per capita output and dramatically increase living standards. And here again, a well-functioning monetary unit facilitates the saving that allows for capital accumulation: Income need not be consumed immediately but can be transferred to others to invest productively in return for future payment streams. Sound money, in short, greatly enhances wealth-creating exchange and transfer of resources between present and future, and in doing so often assists in the development of higher output capacity in the future.
There is a third crucial way in which sound money serves to advance civilized human progress: By providing a common denominator for the expression of all exchange prices between goods, money greatly facilitates trade among all parties, thus extending the breadth of markets as far as money’s use itself, which in turn intensifies the division of labor that increases productive output and per capita incomes. Think about it: Without a monetary unit of account there would be an infinite array of prices for one good against all other goods; for example, the bread-price of shoes, the book-price of apples, and so on. In turn, calculation of profit and loss, on which effective use of scarce resources so critically depends, would be impossible.
In sum the institutional development and use of money has been an immense human achievement, every bit as important as language, property rights, the rule of law, and entrepreneurship in the advancement of human civilization. And it is important to note that while several commodities were tried as monetary exchange media over the centuries, from fish to cigarettes, the precious metals and especially gold were seen to be most effective, as they are valuable, highly divisible, durable, uniform in composition, easily assayable, transportable, and bear high value-to-bulk, along with being relatively stable in annual supply. In short, in an ever-changing world of imperfection, gold has been found to be a near-perfect, and certainly dependably valued, form of money.
Money, International Trade, and Economic Growth
To understand much about our current economic challenges and what to do to meet them, it is important to understand why gold, after several centuries of trial and error, came to be seen as sound money versus paper, other commodities, and even silver. The term sound money is especially important to grasp: It is meant to describe a reliable, dependably valued medium of exchange and account, not subject easily to manipulation, which can therefore effectively perform the three functions of money described above, all of which lead to prosperity and an advancing economy. This is critical for a civilized society whose economy is based on monetary exchange, because money is literally one-half of every transaction. So when the value of the monetary unit is volatile—when money becomes more or less unsound—it changes the intended terms of trade between parties, especially when that transaction involves exchange between present and future, as in capital investment. This in turn can cause such exchanges to break down or lead to distortions in trade that bring malinvestment of assets and waste of scarce resources.
No better illustration of this can be seen than in the German hyperinflation of 1923. German war reparations mandated by Versailles had so burdened the German economy that the German government took literally to printing the currency known as the papiermark in massive quantities. This rapidly depreciated the value of the currency until in the fall of 1923 workers were paid in wheelbarrows of cash twice daily. The velocity of spending skyrocketed, as workers immediately rushed to trade the quickly worthless paper money for anything of tangible value, buying commodities they often did not need. Saving and investment were stunted, price inflation soared out of control, and civil society lurched toward a complete breakdown by the end of 1923, when $1, which had bought 5.21 marks in 1918, now bought 4.2 trillion of them.
Seen another way, the German hyperinflation is an example of a “virus” infecting the economy, distorting prices in every transaction, every entrepreneurial investment decision, and the value of every bank account. Every calculation of profit and loss was changed in real terms as well, thus causing resources to be inefficiently used or traded—that is, wasted. While the harm caused by unsound money is usually less than what occurred in 1923 in Germany, it was no less real in a 1970s-style inflation, a 1930s-style deflation, or a 2000s-style housing bubble fueled by falsified interest rates thanks to the Fed’s over-creation of money.
Conversely it was sound money, based on the international gold standard, that greatly impelled the fantastic rise in living standards across the nineteenth century in many parts of the globe. Gold as a common medium facilitated dramatic increases in trade and the international division of labor. With a dependably valued international medium of exchange and unit of account, long-term investment could be undertaken, and ever-increasing volumes of mutually profitable trading developed between nations, increasing jobs, output, and living standards dramatically. The century up to 1914 was a golden age of prosperity and harmony among nations, and while not devoid of all war, recessions, or panics, it was comparatively more peaceful and productive than any other period in human history.
The Rise of Central Banking
While the Bank of England was created in 1694, the United States did not get a central bank until the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913; by 1935, with the creation of the Bank of Canada, all modern nations had central banks. In theory a central bank, through monopoly banknote issue and effective control of a nation’s money supply, serves as a stabilizing influence in an economy by acting as a banker’s bank, a lender of last resort providing liquidity in panics, and a regulator of commercial banks and thus governor of their excesses. (However, in a recent exhaustive study, economists George Selgin and William Lastrapes of the University of Georgia and Lawrence White of George Mason University show that recessions were shorter and less severe, inflation and unemployment lower, and economic growth stronger and more durable in the century before 1913 than since the Fed’s creation). At the least, the central bank’s mandate included—and seemed to assure—maintenance of the value of the currency.
Beginning with World War I, and continuing through the Great Depression and World War II, the links to gold were for the most part effectively severed from most nations’ currencies, including the U.S. dollar. In the summer of 1944 economists (led by John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White) met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to design a postwar monetary system conducive to international trade. The resulting mechanism, known as the gold-exchange standard, tried to resurrect the beneficial aspects of the nineteenth century’s classical gold standard and lasted until Nixon scrapped it in 1971. In short the Bretton Woods agreement charged the U.S. government with defining the dollar in gold ($35 per ounce) and maintaining convertibility at this rate only with foreign governments and central banks. (Pointedly, there was no similar obligation to U.S. banks or citizens; gold had disappeared from circulation in the United States after Franklin Roosevelt’s 1933 decree.) In turn all foreign nations were to peg their currencies to the dollar, thereby preserving a regime (however illusory) of fixed exchange rates so as to promote certainty in international exchange and encourage cross-border trade and investment.
By the 1960s this system was beginning to break down on all sides. Foreign governments announced periodic devaluations against the gold-linked dollar to promote exports and allow for domestic government spending, and the United States ramped up “guns-and-butter” federal spending on both the Great Society and the Vietnam War. Inflation slowly crept into the U.S. economy, and gold-redemption requests spiked by the late 1960s at the U.S. Treasury’s gold window.
Nixon thus made his fateful decision in the summer of 1971, freeing the government from any redemption obligations. This had two immediate effects: It amounted to an automatic, if stealthy, repudiation of U.S. debt in real terms because it devalued all dollar-denominated assets and currency at once. It also allowed the U.S. government, in concert with a technically independent Federal Reserve, to manage the U.S. money supply for its own political ends indefinitely.
The Predictable Aftermath of 1971
In developing his theory of money and credit a century ago, the great economist Ludwig von Mises explained why a system of fiat currencies was bound to break down: The politicians’ urge to inflate the money supply in order to commandeer the resources of the real economy via expanded government spending would prove too great. Further, because the dollar was the de facto reserve currency of the globe post-Nixon (replacing gold itself), any U.S. inflation would encourage other nations’ monetary expansions and competitive devaluations in tandem. And indeed, an era of predictable instability has been the result: A trenchant stagflation in the 1970s was followed by banking and S&L crises in the 1980s; Russian, Asian, and Latin American banking crises in the 1980s–90s; overleveraged financial institutions and moral hazard-based bailouts of too-big-to-fail institutions in the 1990s–2000s; and in the last decade or so two Fed-induced bubbles and subsequent crashes. The second of those, based in the housing sector, “went viral” across the world thanks to the huge nominal amount of funds plus leverage of U.S.-based mortgage debt, coupled with the expectation on the part of investors that the U.S. government would guarantee any mortgage-bond losses.
This instability has starkly proven another tenet of Mises’s seminal work: Fiat currencies managed by central banks with a monopoly on note issue, rather than being a source of macro stability, are themselves the causal agents of repeated boom-and-bust business cycles. By increasing the money supply at zero effective cost, central banks encourage government spending and cause interest rates to fall below their natural rate, which induces private investment and a temporary boom. But this boom, usually in capital-equipment sectors or long-term durables, is not based on real individual and institutional savings. That is, the accumulation of capital is not “backed” by the real resources of society. By definition such a boom is inherently unsustainable and unstable, and must end in a bust and painful retrenchment. The greater and longer the creation of fiat money by the central bank, the harder and longer will be the ensuing recession.
A Path to Reform
The best solution to the myriad problems caused by the Fed’s post-Nixon fiat currency management is to return to sound money generated by private markets and intermediated by freely competing banks issuing their own notes. These notes could be backed by any commodity but most likely would involve a return to gold. Banks would compete for customer deposits and loan business on the basis of the soundness of their balance sheets and thus could not over-issue—or else they’d face redemption of their outstanding notes and a potential collapse from a bank-run. Such a system is far more stable than a monopoly central bank without constraints, subject to the inexorable pull of political designs (that is, malfeasance).
But there are many challenges to developing and implementing such a free-banking system with commodity money; this is the subject of work to be published in the future. Meanwhile a second-best solution would be for the Federal Reserve to cease and desist with any further fiat money creation—in essence, freeze the monetary base where it is, permanently. The Fed could then announce an intent to return to full gold convertibility, and any new notes it issued (and used by Fed member banks) would be 100 percent backed by gold. Any maturing securities held as assets on the Fed’s balance sheet would be used to purchase gold to build the Fed’s reserves. The permanent price of gold would be set over a period of months after the announcement of the new regime, as gold itself and competing currencies traded at new (lower) levels based on the U.S. government’s new commitment to dollar stability.
The results of this reform program would be electric and dramatic. Capital investment would soar in the United States, as America became a haven for high-productivity ventures once again. The entire U.S. economy would in effect be recapitalized. While an end to activist Fed monetary policy would raise the short end of the yield curve, over time real interest rates would revert to historic low levels due to dollar stability. Such monetary reform implies pro-growth fiscal reforms as well; the U.S. government’s profligacy would have to end because fiscal laxity would no longer be supported by an accommodating Fed. A new, sound dollar and a passive Fed would also engender other pro-growth reforms in banking, such as a reduction in or end to deposit insurance and a lower burden of regulations that stunt growth. The banking sector would at once be more competitive, better capitalized, less brittle, and on sounder footing itself.
To bring this about monetary policy must again become a big political issue—the dominating political issue—in a way it has not been since the presidential election of 1896, when William Jennings Bryan railed against a “cross of gold.” Indeed this can happen if people come to understand that the main culprit of U.S. booms and busts since 1971, and indeed the primary progenitor of the global disaster of 2008—from which we have yet to recover—is the political management of money by the Federal Reserve. Sound money, honest money, besides being a necessary cause of sustainable economic growth itself, is the antidote to the tragically unnecessary torpor of our modern world.