The Failure of the State Employment Service
AUGUST 01, 1962 by OSCAR W. COOLEY
Mr. Cooley is Associate Professor of Economics at
Few, if any, private business ventures have been more pushed around and kicked about by government than have employment agencies.
Even at the turn of the century the employment agent was looked upon as a grasping character, intent upon exploiting the "poor worker" when he was most in need. Scarcely anyone bothered to consider why the jobless might seek an agent’s help, thus placing themselves in his power.
So it was that legislators passed laws strictly regulating the agencies and setting up "free" state employment services to compete with them. Since 1933, all the state services have operated under the wing of the United States Employment Service, which pays their bills.
Even their friends admit that the state employment services show a dismal record. As early as 1914, a writer in the National Municipal Review stated that 19 states had such services but, except in
Former Secretary of Labor, James P. Mitchell, stated in 1958 that nonagricultural employment had increased by over nine million workers in the preceding decade but that nonagricultural placements by the state employment services had declined.4
Employers who have job openings are loathe to turn to the state employment service as a reliable source of high-grade labor. Many employers do not even report their job openings to the service, preferring to fill the openings in their own way—that is, by means of "help wanted" ads, through private employment firms (of which there are some 4,400 throughout the country) and by hiring at the gate.
Some of the Complications
When the state employment services were married to the unemployment compensation system in the 1930′s, they were given the responsibility of getting jobs for compensation claimants. This partially explains why the applicants referred by the state services are not eagerly snapped up by employers; they may lack the ability to hold a job. Of all the job-seekers, they presumably are the least thrifty, and the most likely to apply for public aid; neither characteristic recommends them highly to employers. They are also a heterogeneous lot, for the employment service must seek jobs for all who apply and who are deemed eligible for compensation.
Furthermore, employment service officials are bureaucrats, paid out of public funds rather than by those whom they serve; they lack the economic incentive to give personal service.
Since many job openings are not listed with the unpopular state employment services, such openings may never be known to compensation claimants. Many of the latter do not exert themselves to find jobs, nor are they urged by employment service officials to do so. Thus, the service’s own lack of knowledge of the jobs available actually encourages people to remain idle and collect compensation.
More and more the government employment service in each state is operating as a general employment exchange, for job-seekers not receiving compensation as well as those who are, and even trying to place persons who are already employed but want other jobs. Handsome offices are being built to impress employers and win their patronage.
A recent bulletin describes the invasion of the employment agency field taking place in Colorado.5 Bernard Teets, director of the state employment service, is quoted as saying that 60 to 65 per cent of his appropriation of $2,700,000 for 1958 was devoted to serving already employed persons, that his bureau was handling 60 per cent of the employment business in the state, and that in five years it would handle 90 per cent. His budget had more than doubled in the preceding five years.
In The Field Representative and His Work, a manual published in 1940 by the Ohio State Employment Service, personnel are instructed how they should meet criticism:
If the employer says, "I am against government in business… including the OSES," tell him OSES was founded in 1890 at the request of labor and employers to combat the abuses which were practiced by private agencies. The bringing together of unemployed workers and employers’ jobs is logically a community function, a government function the same as the post office, the police, and fire departments—a service to all the citizens of the community… If the employer says, "We use private agencies because the applicant is more likely to stick and work harder when he has to pay for a job," say: Workers are more efficient when free from worries. Paying for a job does not imply that applicant is better or more efficient. In many cases it is quite the opposite, because the payment of a fee puts a decided hardship on the worker and causes financial worries. The Service charges no fee either to you or to the worker.
The implication in this document is that workers and employers need to be protected by a solicitous state from the "abuses" of private employment agencies. Fee-charging, it seems, is one such abuse.
The advertisement, "No charge to employer or employee," which is freely used by the state employment service in its radio and other appeals, suggests that finding jobs for people is rightfully a charity, not a business. This notion stems from the viewpoint that the jobless are disadvantaged persons, innocent victims of a faulty system, which inevitably disemploys some. They are, it seems, objects of charity to be cared for by a social agency.
A Dual Role To Play
The efficiency of the agency which mothers the unemployed is greatly affected by the dual role which it must play: first, the payment of compensation to the jobless registrant, and second, the finding of a job for him. To picture this process of "carrying water on both shoulders," let us assume that the function of paying compensation is performed by C, the employment-getting function by E.
C’s functions are, first, to interview the claimant with a view to determining his eligibility to receive compensation; second, to determine the amount of compensation to which he is entitled and authorize its payment; and third, to maintain a continuous check on his eligibility and cut off payments when he comes to the end of his benefit period.
E’s functions are, first, to record the working history of the claimant, his qualifications and skills; second, to record the job openings reported by employers; and third, to refer the claimant to jobs which seem suitable, one after another, until he is hired.
C, it should be noted, is a sort of "employer." He pays the claimant a sum of money weekly for a limited period of time ( maximum: 26 weeks in most states, unless increased to 39 by federal supplemental compensation). E, meanwhile, is trying to interest the claimant in entering the service of another employer who will pay him a higher wage (in most cases), perhaps indefinitely, but who also will require some 40 hours per week of labor, performed according to the employer’s directions, whereas C requires no labor. The claimant naturally weighs these two alternatives, balancing one against the other.
At first glance, C’s proposition would seem the less lucrative since unemployment pay averages but $31 per week (proposed legislation would raise it to two-thirds the worker’s average wage7). Upon examination, however, the offer of pay while idle has its attraction. Unemployment compensation is not subject to income tax, either federal or state. The recipient has no expense for transportation to and from work, lunches, work clothing, or union dues. And—he has his leisure, which has value, he alone knows how much.
Thus, the claimant’s cash benefit is determined by C, within limits set by the law, but the value of his leisure is completely beyond the control or even the knowledge of C. Hence, the sum of the two, or his total idleness wage, may easily exceed the wage offered by E’s client. The wages of idleness compete with the wages of work, and E has an uphill task.
If the claimant does not want to take the job which E makes available to him, he can easily find an excuse. For example, the wage is lower than he is accustomed to receive (under present law compensation cannot be denied to a claimant who ref uses a job on the ground that it offers substantially less wage and poorer conditions than prevail for similar work in the locality ). Or the job is a long distance from his home; this, too, is an allowable excuse. He, a good union man, would be expected to work with "scabs." The work is beneath him. The work is above him. It is women’s work. Truly, the acceptable excuses are legion.
Often a claimant’s excuse comes as no surprise to E. He has expected it. Why, then, did he bother to make the referral? Perhaps because, in order to collect his week’s stipend from C, the claimant must be able to report that he was referred to a job, applied, and found it unsuitable or was rejected.
The Claimant’s Obligation
Some states suggest that a compensation claimant bestir himself and look for a job independently.
Which Will It Be?
Before 1946 no independent search for work was ordinarily required; now, 28 states specifically require it. Sixteen of these made the change after abuses of the unemployment compensation system were exposed in the 1940′s. However, the federal government is on record as opposing any general requirement that workers conduct an independent search for work.
Those responsible for government employment services should make up their minds what they want to do. Do they want to get unemployed people into jobs? Then it would seem logical to cease paying them liberally to remain idle. But, if they want to turn what was intended to be temporary, emergency unemployment relief into an outright dole, then they should quit trying to operate employment agencies.
The private employment specialist is still in business, despite the massive invasion of his field by the government. The "blue-collar" trade having been largely lured to the "free" state employment offices, private firms now concentrate on placement of white-collar people, including many technicians and executives. For example, one
Some 85 to 90 per cent of placements by private agencies are people already employed but seeking greener pastures. In about two-thirds of the placements, the employer pays the agency fee, this practice having increased in recent years. That employers are willing to pay private agencies to find employees for them indicates a demand for the service.
To an increasing extent, private agencies are placing people in jobs outside the immediate locality. This is accomplished not only through branch offices but through cooperative arrangements between agencies. For example, there is the National Association of Personnel Consultants, which embraces 62 member agencies in 32 states. Copies of job orders are provided each member by the agency in which the order originates. A resume of the qualifications of the applicant to whom the job is referred, including three references, is given the employer. Thus, jobs and applicant are matched, even though widely separated.
Private employment firms cooperate even more broadly through the National Employment Association,
Beyond publishing general information regarding the demand and supply of workers in various areas, the United States Employment Service does little to promote inter-area mobility. Its ineffectiveness was noted by the Committee for Economic Development, in a recent study of distressed areas:
Even were the exchange of information among the employment offices of the nation operating efficiently, the present practice virtually guarantees that the official employment agencies do not have comprehensive information on employment opportunities. The reason for this is that the Employment Service is deeply involved in the administration of unemployment insurance—and necessarily so.¹º
The jobless worker who registers with the local "unemployment office" and then goes home to live on his compensation while he awaits a job that may never come is surely less mobile than the one who registers with a private employment agency, agrees to pay it a fee when and if he takes a job he is referred to, and meanwhile lives on his savings and odd-job income under the urgency of getting a job in the near future.
Private employment agencies, allowed to operate freely and without "competition" by tax-supported bureaus, would help substantially to connect workers with jobs and give the increased mobility today’s worker so greatly needs.
1 F. A. Kellor in National Municipal Review, April 1914.
2 A. Director and P. Douglas, The Problem of Unemployment (New York, 1931), p. 342.
3 W. H. Miernyk, Inter-Industry Labor Mobility (Boston: Bureau of Business & Economic Research, Northeastern U., 1955), p. 22.
4 Quoted by W. Haber and W. J. Cohen, Social Security: Programs, Problems and Policies (Homewood, Ill., 1960), p. 327.
5 "Birth of a Monster," 1959. Bulletin published by private employment agencies.
7 HR 7640, introduced in June 1961.
8 S. Levine, "How To Play the Unemployment Insurance Game," Harper’s, August 1961.
9 R. Altman, Availability for Work, a Study in Unemployment Compensation (Harvard, 1950), p. 118.
10 Distressed Areas in a Growing Economy (Research and Policy Committee, Committee for Economic Development, New York, June 1961).